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A Feeling for History?
Bakhtin and ‘The Problem of Great
Time’
DAVID SHEPHERD
The question of time was, for Bakhtin, an abiding concern. It loomed
large in his early, but only posthumously published, philosophical
works. Thus, in his challenge to ‘theoreticist’ conceptions of ethical
conduct, he claimed that, ‘The abstract moment of truth’s extra-
temporal validity can be contraposed to the equally abstract moment
of the temporality of the object of historical cognition’, while central to
his aesthetic model of author–hero relations are the ‘temporal whole of
the hero’ and a conception of the soul ‘as an inner whole that is
becoming in time’.1 In the period of his preoccupation with the novel, a
focus on time–space relations in narrative as expressed in a historically
developing series of chronotopes in fact tended to give precedence to
the temporal dimension over the spatial. And time continued to
preoccupy him as, in his mature years, perspectives still determinedly
broad, he mused on matters methodological: a text until recently
considered to be his last work ends with the lapidary phrase ‘The
problem of great time [bol ∞shogo vremeni]’.2 But it does not follow from this
that ‘time’ is simply one more of those diﬃcult topics on which we may
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1 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘K ﬁlosoﬁi postupka’, and ‘Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel∞nosti’, in
Sobranie sochinenii v semi tomakh, 1, Filosofskaia estetika 1920-kh godov, ed. S. G. Bocharov and
N. I. Nikolaev, Moscow, 2003, pp. 7–68 (pp. 14–15) and pp. 69–263 (pp. 175, 176);
English translations (modiﬁed) M. M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, ed. Michael
Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov, Austin, TX, 1993, p. 10, and
M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity’, in Bakhtin, Art and Answerability:
Early Philosophical Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans.
Vadim Liapunov, Austin, TX, 1990, pp. 4–256 (pp. 99, 100).
2 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘K metodologii gumanitarnykh nauk’ (hereafter, ‘K metodologii’), in
Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva, ed. S. S. Averintsev and S. G. Bocharov, 2nd edn, Moscow,
1986 (hereafter, Estetika), pp. 381–93 (p. 393); English translation M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Toward
a Methodology for the Human Sciences’ (hereafter, ‘Toward a Methodology’), in Bakhtin,
Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. Vern
W. McGee, Austin, TX, 1986 (hereafter, Speech Genres), pp. 159–70 (p. 170).
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bring to bear the illuminating insights of the uniquely gifted Bakhtin,
that man for all seasons. Time was one of the many problems that
Bakhtin addressed continually as his thought developed; it was not a
problem for which he oﬀered a straightforward or coherent set of
solutions upon which we may unquestioningly rely. Since the mid-
1990s at least it has no longer been possible to present Bakhtin’s work
as a kind of proleptic panacea that can ease contemporary theoretical
and cultural-historical enquiry. In the current moment of Bakhtin
studies, it is recognized that ‘application’ of his theories, which once
seemed so rewarding, should take second place to careful, and overdue,
investigation of their intellectual contexts, their origins, sources and
aﬃliations. This article does not, therefore, set out to present Bakhtin’s
work as providing deﬁnitive answers to any of the myriad questions
that the topic ‘Time in Russia, Russia in Time’ invites us to consider;
rather, it seeks to show, through a discussion of the particular case of
‘great time’, that the most interesting insights into those questions to be
derived from Bakhtin’s work may be found if we see it, in its contexts,
as exemplary of them.
‘I have a term’
In comments on the current state of Soviet literary scholarship made in
1970, Bakhtin famously castigated the tendency to ‘explain a writer
and his works with reference precisely to his present moment and the
immediate past (usually within the bounds of an epoch as we
understand it)’, arguing that ‘Works break the bounds of their time,
they live in the centuries, that is to say, in great time; furthermore, they
often (in the case of great works, always) live a more intense and fuller
life than in their own present moment’.3 A work that is born entirely of
its present moment, and does not contain something of the past, is
incapable of living in the future. Truly great works contain a potential
that may be realized only in the favourable conditions of subsequent
ages. Bakhtin elaborated on this position in an interview of 1971:
I have a term: great time. Now in great time nothing ever loses its
signiﬁcance. Homer, and Aeschylus, and Sophocles, and Socrates, and all
the ancient writers and thinkers remain, with equal entitlement, in great
time. Dostoevskii too is in this great time. And it is in this sense that I
3 M.M. Bakhtin, ‘Otvet na vopros redaktsii Novogo mira’, in Sobranie sochinenii v semi tomakh,
6, ‘Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo’, 1963; Raboty 1960-kh–1970-kh gg., ed. S. G. Bocharov and
L. A. Gogotishvili, Moscow, 2002 (hereafter, Sobranie sochinenii, 6), pp. 451–57 (p. 454)
(hereafter, ‘Otvet’); English translation (modiﬁed) M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Response to a Question
from the Novyi mir Editorial Staﬀ ’, in Speech Genres, pp. 1–9 (pp. 3, 4) (hereafter, ‘Response’);
original publication M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Smelee pol∞zovat∞sia vozmozhnostiami’, Novyi mir,
1970, 11, pp. 237–40.
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consider that nothing dies, but everything is renewed. With every new step
forward our previous steps acquire a new, additional meaning.4
The opposite of ‘great time’ is, predictably enough, ‘small time’ (maloe
vremia). The posthumously published ‘K metodologii gumanitarnykh
nauk’ (‘Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences’) contains
Bakhtin’s complaint that cultural analysis ‘usually grubs around in the
narrow space of small time, that is to say the present moment and the
immediate past and the imaginable — wished for or frightening —
future’. In doing so, analysis fails to see ‘the inﬁnite and unﬁnalizable
dialogue in which not one meaning [smysl] dies’. The work ends with
Bakhtin’s much-quoted assertion that ‘every meaning will have its
festival of rebirth’, followed immediately by ‘The problem of great time’.5
That these were until recently believed to be the ﬁnal words of
‘Bakhtin’s ﬁnal work’6 no doubt reinforced the peculiar poignancy lent
to ‘great time’ by its occurrence in works written towards the end of his
life; and it was perhaps inevitable that appraisals of Bakhtin should
seek to establish the thinker’s own place in ‘great time’, a move in
which theoretical rigour is in danger of taking second place to rhetoric
or even sentimentality.7 More importantly, the concept could be called
upon in support of particular interpretations of Bakhtin’s intellectual
trajectory. For example, in their 1990 studyMikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a
Prosaics, Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson refer to the late works
in general, and the opposition of ‘great time’ and ‘small time’ in
particular, to reinforce one of their most contentious and contended
arguments, that Bakhtin’s mid-career interest in carnival culture was
an aberration, a ‘theoreticist’ departure from his abiding concern with
the rhythms and patterns of individual lived experience, the ‘prosaics’
of everyday life:
Timelessness, the pure presentness celebrated in the work on carnival, is
now seen as limiting because it derives from an obsession with ‘small time’,
a present without perspective, that separates us from the resources of real
4 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘O polifonichnosti romanov Dostoevskogo’, in Sobranie sochinenii, 6,
pp. 458–65 (p. 461); this interview, conducted by the Polish journalist Zbigniew Podgorzec,
was ﬁrst published in Polish in 1971, and in Russian in 1975: see S. G. Bocharov,
‘[Commentary on ‘‘O polifonichnosti romanov Dostoevskogo’’]’, in ibid., pp. 728–31.
5 Bakhtin, ‘K metodologii’, pp. 390, 392, 393; ‘Toward a Methodology’, pp. 167, 169,
170. Modiﬁcations to the published translation include correction of the inaccurate
rendering of ‘prazdnik vozrozhdeniia’ as ‘homecoming festival’, which obscures the use of
a recurrent and key term.
6 S. S. Averintsev and S. G. Bocharov, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘K metodologii gumanitarnykh
nauk’’]’, in Bakhtin, Estetika, pp. 409–12 (p. 409).
7 See, for example, S. S. Averintsev, ‘V stikhii ‘‘bol∞shogo vremeni’’ ’, Literaturnaia gazeta,
1995, 46 (15 November), p. 6; it is equally unsurprising that one obituary of Averintsev
himself should have associated him with the same category: see Andrei Nemzer, ‘Chelovek
‘‘bol∞shogo vremeni’’: Pamiati Sergeia Averintseva’ (2004), <http://www.ruthenia.ru/
nemzer/averincev.html> [accessed 11 July 2005].
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creativity in the future. Bakhtin returns as well to his earlier ideas about the
importance of an individual’s separateness, his speciﬁc place in time, space,
and culture. Not the collective body of the people but the separate body of
a person interacting with and shaped by others reemerges as the precondi-
tion for all dialogue and creativity.8
Bakhtin thus emerges as a critic whose mature thinking lends much-
needed rigour to some familiar positions about the enduring value of
great works of literature and the role of the individual creative
personality. But there are reasons why the matter is not quite as simple
as this might suggest. The ﬁrst is that recently published material from
Bakhtin’s archive reveals that ‘Toward a Methodology for the Human
Sciences’ was the product of a series of actions by Vadim Kozhinov so
questionable that the work’s very existence is now ‘disavowed’ by
Bakhtin’s editors, and that the conclusion of this ‘ﬁnal work’ was in fact
contrived (successfully as it turned out) ‘for eﬀect’.9 The second, more
important, reason is that although in volume ﬁve of Bakhtin’s (still
incomplete) Sobranie sochinenii (Collected Works) two of those editors,
Sergei Bocharov and Liudmila Gogotishvili, describe ‘great time’ as ‘a
8 Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, Stanford,
CA, 1990, pp. 229–30. For an example of the controversy aroused by the approach taken
to carnival in this study, see Clive Thomson and Anthony Wall, ‘Cleaning up Bakhtin’s
Carnival Act’, Diacritics, 23, 1993, 2, pp. 47–70, Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson,
‘Imputations and Amputations: Reply to Wall and Thomson’, Diacritics, 23, 1993, 4,
pp. 93–96, and Clive Thomson and Anthony Wall, ‘Chronic Chronotopicity: Reply to
Morson and Emerson’, Diacritics, 24, 1993, 4, pp. 71–77. For a similar contrast between
Bakhtin’s later and earlier preoccupations, compare Graham Pechey’s assertion that by
‘great time’ Bakhtin ‘signiﬁes the immortality of all meanings’, and that ‘the turn taken by
the late Bakhtin is from the grotesque-in-history to the sublime-in-theory’: Graham Pechey,
‘Eternity and Modernity: Bakhtin and the Epistemological Sublime’, Theoria, 1993, 81/82,
pp. 61–85 (pp. 61, 64).
9 L. A. Gogotishvili, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘Rabochie zapisi 60-kh–nachala 70-kh godov’’]’
(hereafter, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘Rabochie zapisi’’]’), and ‘Obshchaia preambula k
‘‘Rabochim zapisiam 60-kh–nachala 70-kh godov’’ ’ (hereafter, ‘Obshchaia preambula’),
in Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 543–701 (p. 696) and pp. 533–43 (p. 537). Gogotishvili
describes how Kozhinov combined, with little regard for the chronological order of their
composition, materials taken from various notebooks of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as
material dating from the 1940s. He had this typed up, and gave it to Bakhtin in the
expectation that the latter would approve it for publication; Bakhtin, however, evidently
did not look at the typescript. The text was published in 1975 under the title ‘Toward a
Methodology for Literary Scholarship’ (‘Kmetodologii literaturovedeniia’). Kozhinov then
returned the original materials to the archive in a form that suggested that they constituted
a single unit. The 1979 publication was purged of Kozhinov’s transpositions and
interpolations, and the material from the 1940s was published in part, in the editorial
commentary, under the correct title of ‘K ﬁlosofskim osnovam gumanitarnykh nauk’
(‘Toward the Philosophical Bases of the Human Sciences’, subsequently published in full:
see M.M. Bakhtin, ‘K ﬁlosofskim osnovam gumanitarnykh nauk’, in Sobranie sochinenii v semi
tomakh, 5, Raboty 1940-kh–1960-kh godov, ed. S. G. Bocharov and L. A. Gogotishvili,
Moscow, 1996 [hereafter, Sobranie sochinenii, 5], pp. 7–10 [hereafter, ‘K ﬁlosofskim
osnovam’]). The new title, ‘K metodologii gumanitarnykh nauk’, was in fact a heading used
by Bakhtin for just one section of the notes from which the text was compiled. For full
details, seeGogotishvili, ‘Obshchaia preambula’, pp. 535–37, andGogotishvili, ‘[Commen-
tary on ‘‘Rabochie zapisi’’]’, pp. 655–57.
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later term of Bakhtin’s’,10 a third, while for the most part subscribing to
that position, also provides evidence to the contrary. In an article ﬁrst
published in 2001, and later reworked as part of the editorial apparatus
of volume six of the Collected Works, Irina Popova claims that categories
referred to by Bakhtin in works of the 1930s and 1940s, the period of
his most intensive work on carnival and the carnivalesque, are
‘hermeneutically connected’ to ‘great time’, which itself ‘received
terminological formulation’ only in the 1960s.11 In fact Bakhtin’s
reference, in the fragmentary ‘K stilistike romana’ (‘Towards a Stylistics
of the Novel’, late 1944–45), to the ‘great destinies of the word and of
the image’ (‘bol∞shie sud∞by romana i obraza’)12 is too passing and
unelaborated for such a connection to be immediately obvious,
although, as we shall see, other evidence conﬁrms the link. In the case
of the ‘great body’ (referred to frequently throughout the study of
Rabelais, the ﬁrst version of which was completed by 1940), the
associations with ‘great time’ are more readily discerned: in ‘K
ﬁlosovskim osnovam gumanitarnykh nauk’ (‘On the Philosophical
Bases of the Human Sciences’, written between 1940 and 1943, and
combined by Kozhinov with later material to produce the spurious
1975 text ‘Toward a Methodology for Literary Scholarship’), Bakhtin
discusses the relationship between time and laughter, which ‘takes
away the burden of the future’, and claims that it is ‘characteristic of all
cultured people’ to be drawn to ‘become part of the great body’.13
But Popova’s assertion that ‘great time’ itself ‘received terminological
formulation’ only in the 1960s is contradicted by evidence that she
herself adduces in her editorial capacity. In her commentary on ‘[K
voprosam ob istoricheskoi traditsii i o narodnykh istochnikakh Gogo-
levskogo smekha]’ (‘[On Questions of the Historical Tradition and
Popular Sources of Gogolian Laughter]’, probably dating to the ﬁrst
half of the 1940s), Popova quotes preparatory materials for a study of
Menippean satire:
The process of creation does not take place in the head of the creator or on
paper. It takes place in the great world and in great time (in the great
objective memory of humankind). For centuries this word lay alongside
10 S. G. Bocharov and L. A. Gogotishvili, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘1961. Zametki’’]’, in
Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, 5, pp. 647–68 (p. 649). See also, S. G. Bocharov, ‘[Commentary
on Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo]’, in M. M. Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii v semi tomakh, 2,
‘Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo’, 1929. Stat∞i o L. Tolstom, 1929. Zapisi kursa lektsii po istorii
russkoi literatury, 1922–1927, ed. S. G. Bocharov and L. S. Melikhova, Moscow, 2000,
pp. 431–543 (p. 437).
11 See I. L. Popova, ‘O spiritualakh: K istokam ﬁlosoﬁi vozrozhdeniia M. M. Bakhtina’,
Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop, 2001, 3 (36), pp. 81–98 (hereafter, ‘O spiritualakh’); reprinted as
I. L. Popova, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘O spiritualakh (k probleme Dostoevskogo)’’]’, in Bakhtin,
Sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 519–33.
12 M.M. Bakhtin, ‘K stilistike romana’, in Sobranie sochinenii, 5, pp. 138–40 (p. 139).
13 Bakhtin, ‘K ﬁlosofskim osnovam’, p. 10.
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(combined with, harmonized with, responded to) this word and that, this
image comes along with its whole past. This is an objective process in which
words and images developed their logic. [. . .] The more original and novel
a writer, the more of the past his work will recall and renew (not individual
memory). The whole past, the whole history of a genre will be revealed in
his creation in renewed form. It is the logic of the genre, in the sense of the
possibility inherent in it, its plenitude that is actualized in it [his creation].
That which is most original and new bears within it the most memory,
renews the maximum of the past, in it is revealed that with which it [the
past] was pregnant.14
Oleg Osovskii, himself anticipating Popova’s approach, has surmised
that here Bakhtin was intuitively anticipating, in an isolated reference,
a later position.15 Support is lent to this position by the fact that
Bakhtin’s fullest account of Menippean satire appears only in the
chapter on genre added to the revised study of Dostoevskii (1963), and
that his references to Gogol∞’s place in ‘great time’ may be presumed to
be additions made in 1970 to a section omitted from the Rabelais
book.16 In fact, by demonstrating that the term was ﬁrst used in the
1940s, and by anticipating the phrasing and emphases of its later
elaborations, this fragment conﬁrms that ‘great time’ is not entirely a
‘later term’ of Bakhtin’s, and invites us to examine whether its
relationship to other key concepts elaborated in works of the 1930s and
1940s might be more than ‘hermeneutic’.
‘Great becoming’ or ‘the immobility of eternity’?
For example, Bakhtin’s reference to ‘great time’ as the time in which
there takes place an ‘objective process in which words and images
developed their logic’ resonates with his assertion, in ‘Formy vremeni i
khronotopa v romane’ (‘Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the
14 Bakhtin, archival materials dating from the ﬁrst half of the 1940s, quoted in I. L.
Popova, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘[K voprosam ob istoricheskoi traditsii i o narodnykh
istochnikakh gogolevskogo smekha]’’]’, in Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, 5, pp. 420–24
(pp. 423–24). This discrepancy between sections of the editorial apparatus of volume ﬁve
written by diﬀerent scholars, although comparatively minor, is symptomatic of underlying
tensions of a potentially more debilitating nature; for a discussion of these tensions, see Ken
Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy, Oxford, 1999 (hereafter, Mikhail
Bakhtin), pp. 122–24.
15 See O. E. Osovskii, ‘Bol∞shoe vremia’, Bakhtinskii sbornik, 4, 2000, pp. 94–95.
16 See chapter four of M. M. Bakhtin, Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo, Moscow, 1965; English
translation M. M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson,
Manchester, 1984; M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Rable i Gogol∞ (Iskusstvo slova i narodnaia smekhovaia
kul∞tura)’, in Voprosy literatury i estetiki: Issledovaniia raznykh let, Moscow, 1975 (hereafter,
Voprosy), pp. 484–95 (p. 495); English translation M. M. Bakhtin, ‘The Art of the Word and
the Culture of Folk Humor (Rabelais and Gogol)’, trans. by Henryk Baran, in Baran (ed.),
Structuralism and Semiotics: Readings from the Soviet Union, White Plains, NY, 1976, pp. 284–96
(p. 296); and I. L. Popova, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘Dopolneniia i izmeneniia k Rable’’]’, in
Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii, 5, pp. 473–92 (hereafter, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘Dopolneniia’’]’)
(pp. 474, 483).
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Novel’), that ‘Language is essentially chronotopic as a treasure-house
of images’.17 This condensed characterization of the relationship
between language, time, space and imagery occurs not in the main
body of the chronotope essay, written in the 1940s, but in the
‘Zakliuchitel∞nye zamechaniia’ (‘Concluding Remarks’) added by
Bakhtin in 1973 as the work was prepared for publication.18 It is
therefore chronologically closer to the reference in ‘Response’, as part
of Bakhtin’s sustained elaboration of ‘great time’, to ‘the treasure-
houses of meaning’ in Shakespeare, built up within language over
centuries and even millennia.19 As Galin Tihanov has pointed out, this
is an instance of Bakhtin’s now widely recognized indebtedness to the
work of Ernst Cassirer (in this case his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms), an
indebtedness that did leave its mark in the work on the chronotope and
other works of the 1940s, such as ‘Epos i roman’ (‘Epic and Novel’,
1941).20 The association on this point with Cassirer is important not
least because the neo-Kantian thinker was one of the principal sources
of the Hegelian strand in Bakhtin’s thought. And this Hegelianism is
visible in Bakhtin’s history of chronotopic forms: ‘The diﬀerent value
of each particular variety (sub-genre) of the novel is measured by the
progression of human consciousness as it gradually moves towards a
17 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Formy vremeni i khronotopa v romane: Ocherki po istoricheskoi
poetike’, in Voprosy, pp. 234–407 (hereafter, ‘Formy vremeni’) (p. 399); English translation
M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes toward a
Historical Poetics’ (hereafter, ‘Forms of Time’), in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by
M. M. Bakhtin, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and
Michael Holquist, Austin, TX, 1981, pp. 84–258 (hereafter, The Dialogic Imagination)
(p. 251).
18 What was ﬁrst published, and has been subsequently interpreted, as a coherent ‘essay’
on the chronotope is in fact no such thing: Bakhtin was prevailed upon to write his
‘Concluding Remarks’ for what seems to be material extracted from drafts of a work
dealing with the Bildungsroman in Germany and the prose of Goethe (see Hirschkop,Mikhail
Bakhtin, p. 176).
19 Bakhtin, ‘Otvet’, p. 351; ‘Response’, p. 5.
20 See Galin Tihanov, The Master and the Slave: Luka´cs, Bakhtin, and the Ideas of Their Time,
Oxford, 2000 (hereafter,TheMaster and the Slave), p. 156. Tihanov identiﬁes unacknowledged
reference to Cassirer in Bakhtin’s argument in ‘Epic and Novel’, ‘that the deﬁnitions of
time and value in the epic are inseparably linked ‘‘as they are fused in the ancient semantic
layers of languages too’’ ’. The quotation is from M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Epos i roman (O
metodologii issledovaniia romana)’, in Voprosy, pp. 447–83 (p. 459); English translation
‘Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the Novel’, in The Dialogic
Imagination, pp. 3–40 (p. 16; I have amended the English translation which reads, wrongly,
‘as they are also fused in the semantic layers of ancient languages’, and which Tihanov cites
unchanged). On Bakhtin and Cassirer, see especially Craig Brandist, ‘Bakhtin, Cassirer
and Symbolic Forms’, Radical Philosophy, 85, 1997, pp. 20–27, and Brian Poole, ‘Bakhtin
and Cassirer: The Philosophical Origins of Bakhtin’s Carnival Messianism’, South Atlantic
Quarterly, 97, 1998, 3/4, pp. 537–78, where Bakhtin’s plagiarism of passages from a diﬀerent
work by Cassirer is revealed. As Tihanov points out (Tihanov, The Master and the Slave,
p. 157), in the ‘Concluding Remarks’ Bakhtin does refer openly to Cassirer’s Philosophy of
Symbolic Forms and its ‘analysis, rich in factual material, of the reﬂection of time in language
(the assimilation of time by language)’: Bakhtin, ‘Formy vremeni’, p. 399; ‘Forms of Time’,
p. 251 (translation modiﬁed).
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recognition of the historical and social nature of time. [. . .] Bakhtin’s
description of the diﬀerent chronotopes appears to be the counterpart
of Hegel’s exploration of the various stages of the History of Spirit in
his Phenomenology of Mind.’21
Barry Sandywell draws a clear connection between this Hegelian
historicism and great time: ‘Great time is the temporal equivalent of
‘‘polyglossia’’ at the level of cultural traditions, [. . .] the time of
collective, national, and civilizational processes, the time of ‘‘human
emergence and development’’ [. . .] the historicity of culture itself.’22
The quotation here is from the work that was ﬁrst published in 1979 as
‘Roman vospitaniia i ego znachenie v istorii realizma’ (‘The Bildungsro-
man and its Signiﬁcance in the History of Realism’), but is actually
taken from the same longer work as ‘Forms of Time’, where the changes
in the nature of the human being as portrayed in literature are traced
in relation to succeeding chronotopes. By the time literary history
reaches one of the principal denizens of ‘great time’, Goethe, it oﬀers
us a ‘novel of becoming’ in which ‘the becoming of the individual is
given in unbreakable connection with the becoming of the world. The
becoming of the individual takes place in real historical time with its
necessity, its plenitude, its future, its profound chronotopicity’.23 There
is no mention of ‘great time’ in this text (although references to ‘the
plenitude of time’ [polnota vremeni] are frequent, and Bakhtin stresses
Goethe’s sensitivity to the ‘moment of the connection between the past
and present and the necessary future’).24However, the implicit association
between the Hegelian category of ‘becoming’ and ‘great time’ is made
explicit in the 1965 Rabelais book, where Bakhtin notes the eﬀects of a
‘new conception of realism’, one that breaks the connection between
21 Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. 157; see pp. 269–70 on the ‘process of intense
appropriation of Hegel’s work’ in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and throughout the
1930s, and pp. 271–91 on Hegelian features of Bakhtin’s treatment of the body and other
aspects of the carnivalesque. On the relationship between the neo-Kantian and Hegelian
aspects of Bakhtin’s thought, see Craig Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and
Politics, London, 2002, p. 131.
22 Barry Sandywell, ‘The Shock of the Old: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Contributions to the Theory
of Time and Alterity’, in Michael Bell and Michael Gardiner (eds), Bakhtin and the Human
Sciences: No Last Words, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998, pp. 196–213 (p. 208). Sandywell was
unaware of Bakhtin’s use of the term ‘great time’ in the 1940s.
23 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Roman vospitaniia i ego znachenie v istorii realizma: K istoricheskoi
tipologii romana’, inEstetika, pp. 199–249 (hereafter, ‘Roman vospitaniia’) (p. 213); English
translationM.M. Bakhtin, ‘The Bildungsroman and Its Signiﬁcance in the History of Realism
(Toward a Historical Typology of the Novel)’, in Speech Genres, pp. 10–59 (hereafter, ‘The
Bildungsroman’) (p. 23). Modiﬁcations made here to the published translation include
correction of the rendering of stanovlenie by ‘emergence’ (as in the section quoted by
Sandywell: see above). This rendering is characteristic of English translations carried out
before the signiﬁcance of Bakhtin’s use of the Hegelian term was fully appreciated, and in
which stanovlenie was frequently translated as, in addition to ‘emergence’, ‘development’ or
‘formation’. On the Bildungsroman text and Hegel, see also Tihanov, The Master and the Slave,
p. 235.
24 Bakhtin, ‘Roman vospitaniia’, p. 229; ‘The Bildungsroman’, p. 36 (translation modiﬁed).
bakhtin and ‘the problem of great time’40
body and world characteristic of ‘grotesque and folkloric realism’: ‘The
literature of what is known as ‘‘realism of everyday life’’ [bytovoi realizm]
in the seventeenth century (Sorel, Scarron, Furetie`re), alongside
genuinely carnivalesque moments, is already replete with such images
of the arrested grotesque, that is, a grotesque that is almost removed
from great time, from the ﬂow of becoming.’25
No less important in relation to his Hegelian aﬃliations is Bakhtin’s
reference in the preparatory materials cited by Popova to ‘the great
objective memory of humankind’. This ‘great memory’ is also one of
Bakhtin’s concerns in a piece whose opening words, used by its editors
as a title, establish a Hegelian tone: ‘[K voprosam samosoznaniia i
samootsenki. . .]’ (‘[On Questions of Self-Consciousness and Self-
Evaluation. . .’], written between 1943 and 1946) oﬀers a veritable
proliferation of great and small as it contrasts the ‘great experience of
humankind’ (bol ∞shoi opyt chelovechestva) embodied and remembered in
the symbols of folk culture with the ‘small experience’ (malyi opyt)
contained in oﬃcial culture. The relevant passage, not previously
published in English translation, is worth quoting at length, as it oﬀers
a remarkable condensation of a number of Bakhtin’s principal
preoccupations:
The model of the ultimate whole, the model of the world, lying at the basis
of every artistic image. This model of the world is reconstructed over the
c[ou]rse of centuries (or radically, of millennia). The spatial and temporal
notions lying at the basis of this model, its semantic and axiological
dimensions and gradations. The intellectual cosiness of a world lived in by
25 M. M. Bakhtin, Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaia kul ∞tura srednevekov∞ia i Renessansa,
Moscow, 1965 (hereafter, Tvorchestvo), p. 61. The published English translation of this
section is characteristically elliptical and imprecise, omitting Bakhtin’s examples and
concealing his use of the term ‘great time’: ‘The literature known as ‘‘realism of manners’’
was already presenting, together with authentic carnival themes, the images of a static
grotesque entirely removed from the main ﬂux of time and from the ﬂux of becoming’:
M. M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. He´le`ne Iswolsky, Bloomington, IN, 1984
(hereafter, Rabelais), p. 53. I have been unable to check whether the reference to ‘great time’
here is a consequence of the amendments to the text of the Rabelais study made as it was
prepared for publication in the 1960s, or is to be found either in the ﬁrst version of the
Rabelais study Rable v istorii realizma (Rabelais in the History of Realism, completed in 1940 and
submitted for the degree of kandidat nauk in 1946), or in the second, revised to meet the
requirements of the Vysshaia attestatsionnaia komissiia (VAK) in 1949–50. Both versions
are preserved in Bakhtin’s archive, and are scheduled to be published in his Collected Works;
on the relationship to them of the 1965 publication, see Popova, ‘[Commentary on
‘‘Dopolneniia’’]’, pp. 474–75. For an exhaustive account of the submission and defence of
Bakhtin’s dissertation, see Nikolai Pan∞kov, ‘ ‘‘Everything Else Depends on How this
Business Turns Out . . .’’: The Defence of Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dissertation as Real Event, as
High Drama and as Academic Comedy’, Dialogism, 1, 1998, pp. 11–29, and 2, 1999,
pp. 7–40. For an acknowledgement of a connection between carnival and ‘great time’ on
the part of a scholar who, as we have seen, had previously considered the two incompatible,
see Caryl Emerson, ‘Coming to Terms with Bakhtin’s Carnival: Ancient, Modern, sub
Specie Aeternitatis’, in R. Bracht Branham (ed.), Bakhtin and the Classics, Evanston, IL, 2002,
pp. 5–26, where she refers to ‘Bakhtin’s carnival of Great Time’ (p. 19).
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thought that is thousands of years old. The system of folkloric symbols that
were composed over thousands of years and that depicted a model of the
ultimate whole. They contain the great experience of humanity. The
symbols of oﬃcial culture contain only the small experience of a speciﬁc
section of humanity (and at a given moment in time to boot, a section with
an interest in that moment’s stability). These small models, created on the
basis of small and partial experience, are characterized by a speciﬁc
pragmatism and utilitarianism. They serve as a scheme for an individual’s
practically interested action, in them practice does indeed determine
cognition. Therefore they contain deliberate concealment, lies, salutary
illusions of every sort, simplicity and mechanicality of scheme, monosemy
and one-sidedness of evaluation, uniplanarity and logicality (linear logi-
cality). They have an interest least of all in the truth [istina] of the all-
embracing whole (this truth of the whole is non-practical and disinterested,
it is indiﬀerent towards the passing fortunes of the particular). Great
experience has an interest in the succession of great epochs (in great
becoming) and in the immobility of eternity, small experience in changes in
the limits of the epoch (in small becoming) and in temporary, relative
stability. Small experience is constructed on deliberate forgetting and on
deliberate non-plenitude. In great experience the world does not coincide
with itself (it is not what it is), it is not closed and not ﬁnalized. In it there is
memory that does not have borders, memory that descends and disappears
into the pre-human depths of matter and inorganic life, the experience of
the life of worlds and atoms. And for this memory the history of the
individual person begins long before the awakening of his consciousness
(his conscious I). In what forms and spheres of culture is this great
experience, this great memory unlimited by practice, disinterestedmemory,
embodied. Tragedy, Shakespeare — on the level of oﬃcial culture — have
their roots in the extra-oﬃcial symbols of great popular experience.
Language, the unpublishable spheres of discursive life, the symbols of
laughter culture. The basis of myth, not reworked or rationalized by oﬃcial
consciousness. One must know how to capture the authentic voice of being,
the whole of being, being that is more than human, not of a particular part
of it, the voice of the whole and not of one of the parties to it. The memory
of the supra-individual body. This memory of contradictory being cannot
be expressed in monosemantic concepts or monotonal classical images.
Relevant comments by Goethe (a` propos of ‘The Pariah’, I think). Extended
critique of how folklorists study this experience (the translation of the logic
of the whole into the language of the logic of the particular and so on). This
great memory is not memory of the past (in the abstract temporal sense);
time is relative in it. That which returns eternally and is at the same time
irrevocable. Here time is not a line, but a complex form of a rotating body.
The moment of return is captured by Nietzsche, but interpreted by him
abstractly and mechanistically. At the same time openness and unﬁnal-
izedness [nezavershennost∞], memory of that which does not coincide with
itself. Small experience, practically meaningful and consuming, strives to
deaden and reify everything, great experience — to animate everything (to
see in everything unﬁnalizedness and freedom, miracle and revelation). In
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small experience there is one cognizer (everything else is an object of
cognition), one free subject (everything else is dead things), one who is
living and unclosed (everything else is dead and closed), one who speaks
(everything else is unresponsively silent). In great experience everything is
alive, everything speaks, this experience is profoundly and essentially
dialogic. The thought of the world about me as I think, rather I am object-
like in a subject-like world. In philosophy, especially in the Naturphilosophie
of the beginning of the century, all this is nevertheless rationalized and
divorced from the thousands-of-years-old systems of popular symbols, all
this is given as one’s own experience rather than as a passionate
interpretation of the experience of humanity over many thousands of years,
embodied in extra-oﬃcial systems of symbols.26
The absence of the term ‘great time’ does not necessarily diminish
the relevance of this passage for our understanding of the concept;
indeed, it might be said to throw this relevance into sharper relief. The
repeated use of other terms is suﬃcient to conﬁrm Bakhtin’s ‘loyalty to
the author of the Phenomenology’,27 the ‘Science of the Experience of
Consciousness’. The perspective associated here with ‘great experience’
and ‘great memory’ is close to that articulated throughout the
Phenomenology, but particularly with the culmination of the long process
of Spirit’s movement towards the telos of Absolute Knowing. Hence,
perhaps, the appositeness in relation to Bakhtin’s fragmentary, elliptical
thoughts of Judith Shklar’s characterization of Hegel’s more extensive
treatment of recollection and memory: ‘Remembering is bringing the
past into the present by recreating it. It is drawn out of a general,
cultural, not a private consciousness, and made explicit.’28 That said, it
is important to bear in mind that Bakhtin’s immediate points of
reference, whether proven or reliably surmisable, should not be viewed
in isolation from, or as necessarily more important than, aﬃliations
mediated by other sources. In this case, the insistent reference to the
symbols of folk culture reminds us yet again of Bakhtin’s indebtedness
to the Cassirer of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In ‘The Intuition of
Time’, chapter four of his third volume, The Phenomenology of Knowledge,
Cassirer emphasizes that ‘Symbolic representation is no mere looking
back on [. . .] reality as something ﬁnished, but becomes a factor and
motif in its unfolding’. This means that, in historical time, ‘Action is
determined and guided by the historical consciousness, through
recollection of the past, but on the other hand truly historical memory
grows from forces that reach forward into the future and help to give it
26 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘[K voprosam samosoznaniia i samootsenki . . .]’, in Sobranie sochinenii,
5, pp. 72–79 (pp. 77–78).
27 Tihanov, The Master and the Slave, p. 271.
28 JudithN. Shklar, Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Mind, Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne, 1976 (hereafter, Freedom and
Independence), p. 50.
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form. Only to the degree in which the spirit itself ‘‘becomes’’, to the
degree in which it unfolds toward the future, can it see itself in the
image of the past’.29
Quotation of this passage from Cassirer is not to be read as a
suggestion of a direct reference in Bakhtin’s text to a work with which
he is known to have been familiar; for one thing, Bakhtin makes no
mention in ‘[On Questions of Self-Consciousness]’ of the determining
role played by the future (although this is something upon which he
insists throughout the Rabelais book, and, as we have seen, in the
Bildungsroman text). The point is, rather, to draw attention to an
important respect in which both Bakhtin and Cassirer might be seen to
depart from Hegel, one that is summed up well by Charles W. Hendel
in terms of a persisting Kantian problematic:
Cassirer sees the unsolved problem of Kant, that the human understanding
is an ‘image-needing one’. Expand ‘understanding’ to ‘spirit’, and it still
remains the case in every instance that the human spirit needs images
which it uses symbolically to disclose meaning beyond them. There is no
leaping clean out of an image-world so that spirit knows ultimately itself.
[. . .] To Cassirer there is an ‘endless task’ ahead, and the course for man is
one of discovering the inexhaustible possibilities of the formative role of the
human spirit in the course of experience and history.30
The contrast here appears to be speciﬁcally with Hegel’s position at the
end of the Phenomenology, where he states that ‘Spirit necessarily appears
in time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not grasped its pure
Notion, i.e. has not annulled time’.31 Jon Stewart glosses this statement
in the following terms: ‘The Absolute Notion, by contrast, is a
conceptual movement that transcends time. Absolute knowing is an
understanding not of any particular historical development, but of the
necessary categorial movement hidden in history and religion, which is
timeless.’32 On the one hand, Bakhtin’s reference to the interest that
‘great experience’ has in ‘the immobility of eternity’ might seem to
suggest a subscription to this association between the end of Spirit’s
journey and timelessness, and to invite an interpretation of ‘great time’
as denoting something close to such an overcoming or annulment of
time. On the other hand, however, his insistence on ‘openness and
unﬁnalizedness [nezavershennost∞], memory of that which does not
coincide with itself ’ oﬀers a more familiar position compatible with, for
29 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. Ralph Manheim, 3 vols, New
Haven, CT and London, 1953–57, 3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge, pp. 182, 188.
30 Charles W. Hendel, ‘Introduction’, in Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 1,
Language, pp. 1–65 (p. 62).
31 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford, 1977, section
801.
32 Jon Stewart, The Unity of Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’: A Systematic Interpretation,
Evanston, IL, 2000, p. 462.
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example, his claim in the Bildungsroman piece that ‘Everything that
[Goethe] saw he saw not sub specie aeternitatis, like his teacher Spinoza,
but in time and in the power of time’.33 From this perspective, what ‘great
time’ overcomes or annuls is precisely, and only, ‘small time’. This is
not necessarily to cast terminal doubt against theHegelian connotations
of the term, not least since there is no shortage of competing
interpretations of Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between
Absolute Knowing and history. For instance, Judith Shklar oﬀers a
reading of the ﬁnal stages of the Phenomenology rather diﬀerent from
Stewart’s, one in which what is overcome is not time, but eternity:
Revealed religion [the stage in the development of Spirit immediately
preceding Absolute Knowing] did have a consciousness of the history of
mankind. That was its great merit. However, it saw that history as a coming
from and return to a ‘beyond’. Now that we have done with that illusion we
have come to the unity of thought and time. This puts an end to eternity. In
the Christian view of history, time is always put in counterpoint to eternity.
Now there is only time, deﬁned by human development. Only memory
contains and halts change. It has thus superseded eternity. This knowledge
of our history, the total process of our coming to this present point, is the
perfection of knowledge. That is where Hegel has led us.34
Whether this might also be the point to which Bakhtin’s treatment of
great experience, great memory and great time might lead us is a
question that needs to be addressed with reference to the relationship
between these concepts and the religion against which Hegel’s Absolute
Knowing is deﬁned.
‘Once sacred, now they profane’: philosophy, religion, philosophy of religion
‘Bakhtin rightly sees that every eschatology or anticipation of the end
of time will devalue the ethical substance of the present, but he frames
the alternative as a diﬀerent kind of faith rather than as the sceptical
refusal of faith’, a distinction drawn in the early 1960s that ‘reﬂects an
apparently continuing belief that the forward movement of history has
to be grounded in an unredeemable anticipation of redemption’.35
Thus Ken Hirschkop characterizes the consistency with which Bakh-
tin’s successive treatments of history are articulated with an unmistak-
able religious inﬂection.36 This concern with the redemptive ends of
history would appear to be an expression of Bakhtin’s drawing, along
with, if not through the mediation of, Matvei Kagan, on the ‘historical
33 Bakhtin, ‘Roman vospitaniia’, p. 236; ‘The Bildungsroman’, p. 42 (translation modiﬁed).
34 Shklar, Freedom and Independence, p. 50.
35 Hirschkop,Mikhail Bakhtin, p. 237.
36 Hirschkop also notes that the Bildungsroman text, with its focus on the high degree of self-
reﬂexiveness developed by narrative concerned with ‘the hero of the modern chronotope’,
is the work ‘least inﬂected by religious terminology’ (ibid., p. 178).
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messianism’ of the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen.37 Indeed, Bakhtin’s
treatment of the relationship between past, present and future resonates
intriguingly with Kagan’s own characteristically dense formulation of
the problem of ‘history as such’, which ‘presupposes death only in the
past, destruction in the past, but in the future life, defending life from
death, allowing fate to perish and demanding of itself the eternal
contemporaneity of beneﬁcent permanent creativity’.38 But Bakhtin’s
oft-quoted reference to ‘not faith (in the sense of a particular faith in
Orthodoxy, in progress, in man, in revolution, and so on), but a feeling
for faith, that is, an integral relationship (on the part of the whole person)
to a higher and ultimate value’,39 might appear, notwithstanding its
qualiﬁcations, to support surmisals about possible connections between
conceptions advanced by Bakhtin, including ‘great time’, and positions
characteristic of Christianity in general and Orthodoxy in particular.
For example, W. D. Lindsey states conﬁdently that ‘Bakhtin employs
the phrase ‘‘great time’’ to refer to that eschatological plenitude that
will occur when the contribution of every discourse to the consumma-
tion of history will be apparent’, arguing that the concept is an
expression of ‘the kenotic christology and ‘‘radical communality’’ that
ﬁgure prominently in Bakhtin’s theological thought’.40 In general such
readings of Bakhtin’s thought in terms of its relationship to Russian
religious philosophy are hampered by the fact that there is signiﬁcantly
less evidence of this relationship than there is of Bakhtin’s engagement
with the traditions of Western European philosophy; there is thus,
37 See Brian Poole, ‘ ‘‘Nazad k Kaganu’’: Marburgskaia shkola v Nevele i ﬁlosoﬁia M. M.
Bakhtina’, Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop, 1995, 1, pp. 38–48, and Hirschkop, Mikhail Bakhtin,
p. 25. Barry Sandywell has explored the similarities between Bakhtin and another messianic
thinker, Walter Benjamin (with whom Bakhtin shares a number of common aﬃliations),
arguing that the two ‘concur in problematizing the category of redemptive time’. For
Benjamin, ‘the semantic potential of the past shatters the linear image of a continuous line
linking past, present and future’, while for Bakhtin (and here Sandywell highlights once
again the Hegelian connection), ‘the theme of ‘‘great time’’ holds open a promise of
spiritual self-recollection (erinnerungen)’: Barry Sandywell, ‘Memories of Nature in Bakhtin
and Benjamin’, in Craig Brandist and Galin Tihanov (eds),Materializing Bakhtin: The Bakhtin
Circle and Social Theory, London and New York, 2000, pp. 94–118 (p. 108).
38 M. I. Kagan, ‘Evreistvo v krizise kul∞tury’, in O khode istorii, ed. V. L. Makhlin, Moscow,
2004, pp. 171–86 (p. 185). On Kagan’s role as a mediating ﬁgure between major neo-
Kantian philosophers with whom he studied and members of the Bakhtin Circle, in whose
discussions he played a leading role in its early years, see David Shepherd, ‘Re-introducing
the Bakhtin Circle’, in Craig Brandist, David Shepherd and Galin Tihanov (eds), The
Bakhtin Circle: In the Master’s Absence, Manchester, 2004 (hereafter, The Bakhtin Circle),
pp. 1–21 (pp. 7–9).
39 M.M. Bakhtin, ‘1961 god. Zametki’, in Sobranie sochinenii, 5, pp. 329–60 (p. 352).
40 W. D. Lindsey, ‘ ‘‘The Problem of Great Time’’: A Bakhtinian Ethics of Discourse’,
Journal of Religion, 73, 1993, 3, pp. 311–28 (p. 323). See also p. 326: ‘With its emphasis on
the need for every voice to contribute to the dialogue that makes history and with its
protection of suppressed alterity, Bakhtin’s notion of great time echoes both the theology of
anakephalaiosis of Irenaeus and the apokatastasis of Origen, theological concepts that in
Western Christian thought have gradually been subsumed into a soteriological framework
of forensic justiﬁcation.’
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inevitably, a somewhat speculative character to much work in this area,
in which typological similarity is sometimes (mis)represented as
evidence of aﬃliation.41
Somewhat less speculative, because based on (admittedly slight)
textual evidence, is Irina Popova’s hypothesis of a relationship between
‘great time’ and medieval religious thought inWestern Europe. Popova
suggests, ‘with some caution’, that accounts of the thought of medieval
mystics (in Russian spiritualy), and in particular of the ‘hermeneutic
technique’ of the twelfth-century Cistercian monk Joachim of Fiore,
may have had some inﬂuence on Bakhtin, helping to shape the ‘idea
and image of rebirth’ ‘ideia-obraz vozrozhdeniia’ in his book on
Rabelais, and thereby contributing to the ‘conception of history’ that,
‘In the 1960s [. . .] receives terminological designation in the category
of ‘‘great time’’ ’.42 Bakhtin’s actual references to Joachim and the
spiritualy are comparatively few and unelaborated, occurring in the
Rabelais book and in two fragmentary texts of the 1960s;43 he says
nothing directly about the Joachimite division of time into three eras
corresponding to the three hypostases of God, with the Old Testament
(the era of God the Father) being succeeded by the New Testament (the
era of God the Son), and the future Eternal Gospel (Evangelium
aeternum) marking the era of the Holy Spirit. Konrad Burdach’s
treatment of Joachim and other spiritualy in his 1918 book Reformation,
Renaissance, Humanismus, to which Bakhtin refers in the Rabelais study,
is the only direct source adduced by Popova, although she suggests a
‘hypothetical list’ of other possibilities, as well as pointing to the ‘Third
Renaissance’ of early twentieth-century Russia as an important
inﬂuence. Popova’s salutary caution extends to her noting Sergei
Averintsev’s observation about the echoes of Joachim’s ‘hermeneutic
technique’ in the philosophy of history advanced by Hegel, Schelling
41 This is true, for example, of a number of the contributions to Susan M. Felch and Paul
J. Contino (eds), Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling for Faith, Evanston, IL, 2001.
42 Popova, ‘O spiritualakh’, p. 95; ‘[Commentary on ‘‘O spiritualakh (k probleme
Dostoevskogo)’’]’, p. 532.
43 See Bakhtin, Tvorchestvo, pp. 64–66; Rabelais, pp. 56–58; M. M. Bakhtin, ‘O spiritualakh
(k probleme Dostoevskogo)’, in Sobranie sochinenii, 6, pp. 369–70; and M. M. Bakhtin,
‘Rabochie zapisi 60-kh–nachala 70-kh godov’, in ibid., pp. 371–439 (p. 400).
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and especially Vladimir Solov∞ev, thereby shifting attention back to
traditions on which Bakhtin demonstrably drew.44
Among the ﬁrmly attested sources for the model of cyclical time and
rebirth and regeneration proposed in the Rabelais book is work by
Ol∞ga Freidenberg drawing on Marrist semantic palaeontology in
particular, and more generally on a range of anthropological accounts
of the origins of popular festivity.45 Such anthropological accounts are
also the subject of a passing reference in a fragmentary text written in
1944–45, and devoted principally to Flaubert:
There are some who presume to get away with explaining things by
reducing them to their origin, to ancient ignorance and lack of knowledge.
Diametrically opposed evaluation of origins (once sacred, now profane).
Varying evaluation of forward movement: it is now thought of as a pure,
inﬁnite, unlimited movement away from origins, as a pure and irreversible
departure, a movement away along a straight line. Such was the conception
of space too: absolute straightness. Relativity theory revealed for the ﬁrst time
the possibility of a diﬀerent way of thinking space when it assumed its
curvature, its bending back on itself and, consequently, the possibility of a
return to the beginning. The Nietzschean idea of eternal return. The point
here is the possibility of a completely diﬀerent model of movement. But this
especially concerns the axiological model of becoming, the path taken by
the world and humankind, in the axiological-metaphorical sense of the
word. The theory of the atom and the relativity of great and small [bol ∞shogo
i malogo].46
According to Liudmila Gogotishvili, in speaking of the ‘diametrically
opposed evaluation of origins’ Bakhtin probably has in mind a contrast
between, on the one hand, ‘a theory of primitive religion [. . .] going
44 Popova, ‘O spiritualakh’, pp. 94, 95; ‘[Commentary on ‘‘O spiritualakh (k probleme
Dostoevskogo)’’ ’, pp. 531–32. A recent authoritative study of Joachimism conﬁrms
Averintsev’s suggestion that, in the Russian context, due weight should be given to the
mediating role of Western dialectical philosophy: ‘Perhaps some faint echoes of Joachimism
reached [Russian visionaries] through Renaissance prophets such as Lichtenberger and
Mu¨ntzer. Certainly Soloviev’s vision of divine Sophia illuminating an ecumenical Church
is close to Joachim’s spiritualis intellectus in the Church of the third status to which all peoples
would stream. But the alternative sources for this way of interpreting history in three stages
are clear: the historic myth of the Third Rome, the importance of the Trinity in the Russian
mystical vision, the writings of Leroux and Sand, especially the novel Spiridion, and the
widespread inﬂuence of western dialectical thought, with its resolution of dualisms in a
third stage. Unless some positive evidence is forthcoming, we must conclude that the case
for direct Joachimist inﬂuence in the nineteenth-century Russian prophetical movement is
unproven’: Warwick Gould and Marjorie Reeves, Joachim of Fiore and the Myth of the Eternal
Evangel in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 2nd edn, Oxford, 2001, pp. 331–32. On the
Bakhtin Circle and the Third Renaissance, see Nikolai Nikolaev, ‘Lev Pumpianskii and the
Nevel School of Philosophy’, in Brandist, Shepherd and Tikanov (eds), The Bakhtin Circle,
pp. 125–49 (pp. 135–37, 143).
45 See O. E. Osovskii, ‘ ‘‘Iz sovetskikh rabot bol∞shuiu tsennost∞ imeet kniga O. Freidenb-
erg’’: Bakhtinskie marginalii na stranitsakh Poetiki siuzheta i zhanra’, Bakhtinskii sbornik, 4,
2000, pp. 128–34, and Brandist,The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 134–37.
46 M.M. Bakhtin, ‘[O Flobere]’, in Sobranie sochinenii, 5, pp. 130–37 (p. 135).
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back to ‘‘comparative mythology’’ as a branch of ‘‘comparative study
of religions’’ ’ and, on the other, ‘An opposing — ‘‘profane’’ —
evaluation of ‘‘origins’’ as culture’s lowest stage, evolving along a rising
straight line until it reaches the contemporary type of thinking’, an
evaluation associated with thinkers such as Frazer, but most clearly
articulated by the French anthropologist Lucien Le´vy-Bruhl. The
object of Bakhtin’s critique is not, she continues, the founding
opposition of sacred and profane associated with Le´vy-Bruhl’s teacher,
Durkheim; rather, his comments are directed principally against the
tendency in Soviet scholarship, among both supporters (such as Marr)
and opponents (such as Kautsky) of Le´vy-Bruhl, to over-simplify his
theories ‘against a Marxist background’, and can be seen to resonate,
though not necessarily coincide, with the critical positions advanced by
a number of other thinkers, notably Lucien Febvre, Aleksei Losev,
Arnold Toynbee and Claude Le´vi-Strauss.47 But the precise nuances of
Bakhtin’s unelaborated polemic are less important for our purposes
than the fact that he should introduce this anthropological terminology
as part of a discussion of an ‘axiological model of becoming’ that is, as
we have seen, indissociable from his thinking on ‘great time’.
An especially succinct categorization of time in terms of the sacred
and the profane is that oﬀered by the anthropologist and phenomenolo-
gist of religion Mircea Eliade: ‘On the one hand there are the intervals
of a sacred time, the time of festivals (by far the greater part of which
are periodical); and on the other there is profane time, ordinary
temporal duration, in which acts without religious meaning have their
setting.’ According to Eliade, ‘Religious man periodically ﬁnds his way
into mythical and sacred time, re-enters the time of origin, the time that
‘‘ﬂoweth not’’ because it does not participate in profane temporal
duration, because it is composed of an eternal present, which is indeﬁnitely
recoverable’; ‘It is the eternal present of the mythical event that makes
possible the profane duration of historical events.’48 At ﬁrst sight this
opposition might appear to map in straightforward manner on to
Bakhtin’s distinction between the ‘small time’ of individual historical
epochs and the ‘great time’ that overcomes small time. Postulation of
signiﬁcant common ground between the two thinkers might seem to be
further justiﬁed by Eliade’s juxtaposition of two of Bakhtin’s points of
reference, one hypothesized, the other ﬁrmly attested:
47 See L. A. Gogotishvili, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘[O Flobere]’’]’, in Bakhtin, Sobranie sochinenii,
5, pp. 492–507 (pp. 504, 505). For a more nuanced account of the relationship between the
work of Le´vy-Bruhl and Marr and his followers (including Freidenberg), one that takes into
account Bakhtin’s own far from entirely negative assessment of Marr, see Brandist, The
Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 109–11.
48 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask,
San Diego, CA, New York and London, 1957 (hereafter, The Sacred and the Profane), pp. 68,
88, 89.
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In the Calabrian abbot [Joachim of Fiore]’s vision, each of [the three]
epochs reveals, in history, a new dimension of the divinity and, by this fact,
allows humanity to perfect itself progressively until ﬁnally, in the last
phase — inspired by the Holy Ghost — it arrives at absolute spiritual
freedom. [. . .] From the seventeenth century on, linearism and the
progressivistic conception of history assert themselves more and more,
inaugurating faith in an inﬁnite progress, a faith already proclaimed by
Leibniz, predominant in the century of ‘enlightenment’, and popularized
in the nineteenth century by the triumph of the ideas of the evolutionists.
We must wait until our own century to see the beginnings of certain new
reactions against this historical linearism and a certain revival of interest in
the theory of cycles; so it is [. . .] that in philosophy the myth of the eternal
return is reviviﬁed by Nietzsche [. . .].49
In the text on Flaubert, as we have just seen, Bakhtin mentions the
‘Nietzschean idea of eternal return’. That this mention is both preceded
and followed by reference to theory of relativity (and to the relativity of
great and small) is signiﬁcant, and echoes his treatment of Nietzsche in
‘[On Questions of Self-Consciousness]’: ‘This great memory is not
memory of the past (in the abstract temporal sense); time is relative in
it. That which returns eternally and is at the same time irrevocable.
Here time is not a line, but a complex form of a rotating body. The
moment of return is captured by Nietzsche, but interpreted by him
abstractly and mechanistically.’50 Both these references to Nietzsche
suggest that for Bakhtin the concept of eternal return is something that
needs to be taken account of in his theorization of time, but as a further
problem rather than as a solution to the cluster of problems already
addressed.51 If for Eliade a notion of eternal return is entirely
49 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask, New York, 1965
(hereafter, Eternal Return), pp. 145–46.
50 Bakhtin, ‘[K voprosam samosoznaniia i samootsenki . . .]’, p. 78.
51 ‘Bakhtin’s idea of ‘‘eternal return’’ most probably does not coincide with Nietzsche’s: in
this sense Nietzsche was probably valued by [Bakhtin] simply for his historically timely
accentuation of the problem’: Gogotishvili, ‘Commentary on ‘‘[O Flobere]’’]’, p. 504. This
is not to say that there may not be Nietzschean overtones to Bakhtin’s treatment of time; as
so often, it is essential to be sensitive to the mediation of key ideas. For example, in referring
to ‘great time’ as ‘a later term’ used by Bakhtin to denote and explain the greatness of
writers such as Dante, Dostoevskii and Shakespeare, Bocharov and Gogotishvili note the
similarity between Bakhtin’s move and the Symbolist poet, critic and classical scholar
Viacheslav Ivanov’s association of Dostoevskii with ‘great, pandemic art’ (‘bol∞shoe,
vsenarodnoe iskusstvo’), ‘great [bol ∞shoe], Homeric or Dantean, art’: see Bocharov and
Gogotishvili, ‘[Commentary on ‘‘1961. Zametki’’]’, p. 649. The signiﬁcance of Ivanov’s
reading of Dostoevskii’s ‘novel-tragedy’ for the approach taken by Bakhtin in Problemy
tvorchestva Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevskii’s Art, 1929) and in the revised version of this
study, Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevskii’s Poetics, 1963) is well known. For a
lucid account that gives due weight to the role played by Bakhtin’s close associate Lev
Pumpianskii in mediating and directing the inﬂuence of Ivanov (and, through him, of
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy), see Bocharov, ‘[Commentary on Problemy tvorchestva Dostoev-
skogo]’, pp. 437–42; see also O. E. Osovskii, ‘F. Rable, karnaval i karnaval∞naia kul∞tura v
rabotakh M. M. Bakhtina 1930–1950-kh gg.’, Dialog. Karnaval. Khronotop, 1, 2002, 38,
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compatible with, indeed a necessary consequence of, the continuing
accessibility in profane historical time of illud tempus, the ‘great time’ of
origins, for Bakhtin it must be seen in terms of contemporary scientiﬁc
theories that problematize the relationship between the linear and the
cyclical.52 Eliade’s model of ‘great time’ is also, moreover, a resolutely
non- or anti-Hegelian one. Thus ‘eternal return reveals an ontology
uncontaminated by time and becoming’,53 whereas
Hegel takes over the Judaeo-Christian ideology and applies it to universal
history in its totality: the universal spirit continually manifests itself in
historical events and manifests itself only in historical events. [. . .] The
road is thus opened to the various forms of twentieth-century historicistic
philosophies. [. . .] Yet we must add that historicism arises as a decomposi-
tion product of Christianity; it accords decisive importance to the historical
event (which is an idea whose origin is Christian) but to the historical event as
such, that is, by denying it any possibility of revealing a transhistorical,
soteriological intent.54
It must be emphasized that the purpose of this extended juxtaposition
of Bakhtin and Eliade is not to suggest the existence of any direct link
between the two thinkers. Rather, the contrast between their solutions
to problems similarly posed, because in large measure arising from
engagement with a signiﬁcant body of shared traditions, aﬃliations
and sources,55 is helpful as a way of highlighting the complex and
contradictory nature of Bakhtin’s thinking about time in general, and
‘great time’ in particular. Bakhtin’s model of ‘great time’, in contrast to
Eliade’s more harmonious system, is fraught (or, in his terms, pregnant)
with the tension between a Hegelian historicism and a simultaneous
will to discover an order of time in which there would remain room for
pp. 59–74 (p. 61). For a general account of Ivanov’s aesthetic theory, see Victor Terras,
‘Vyacheslav Ivanov’s Aesthetic Thought: Context and Antecedents’, in Robert Louis
Jackson and Lowry Nelson Jr. (eds), Vyacheslav Ivanov: Poet, Critic and Philosopher, NewHaven,
CT, 1986, pp. 326–45 (on Ivanov’s opposition of ‘great’ and ‘small’ and its antecedents, see
pp. 334–37).
52 Relativity theory is, of course, together with Kantian thought, a crucial reference point
for Bakhtin’s deﬁnition of the chronotope. For an incisive account of Bakhtin and relativity
theory, and of previous treatments of the question, see Erik Dop, ‘A Dialogic Epistemology:
Bakhtin on Truth and Meaning’, Dialogism, 2000, 4, pp. 7–33. On the Kantian dimensions
of the chronotope, see Bernhard F. Scholz, ‘Bakhtin’s Concept of the ‘‘Chronotope’’: The
Kantian Connection’, in David Shepherd (ed.), The Contexts of Bakhtin: Philosophy, Authorship,
Aesthetics, Amsterdam, 1998, pp. 141–72.
53 Eliade, Eternal Return, p. 89.
54 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, p. 112.
55 Apart fromHegel andNietzsche, ﬁgures to whom both Bakhtin and Eliade are indebted,
in diﬀerent ways and to diﬀerent degrees, include Bergson, Cassirer and Le´vy-Bruhl: see
Bryan S. Rennie, Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion, Albany, NY, 1996.
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a ‘transhistorical, soteriological intent’.56 In this sense the very concept
of ‘great time’, ﬁrst formulated in the 1940s but deployed predomi-
nantly from the 1960s onwards, might be seen as exemplifying its own
(Hegelian) premises by holding and unfolding within itself the (great)
memory of the successive stages of Bakhtin’s intellectual development,
and by simultaneously gesturing towards and deferring an ultimate
resolution of contradiction.
56 This tension is closely related to the tension identiﬁed by Galin Tihanov in his incisive
analysis of the contradictions (traceable to his neo-Kantian and Hegelian aﬃliations) in
Bakhtin’s position on the novel and on the body in the 1930s and 1940s between a drive to
historicization and an attachment to the perennial and unalterable: see Tihanov, The Master
and the Slave, pp. 161, 290; see also Galin Tihanov, ‘The Body as a Cultural Value: Brief
Notes on the History of the Idea and the Idea of History in Bakhtin’s Writings’, Dialogism,
2001, 5–6, pp. 111–21.
